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Abstract We study the problem of maximizing expected utility from terminal wealth for
a not necessarily concave utility function U and for a budget set given by one fixed pricing
measure. We prove the existence and several fundamental properties of a maximizer. We
analyze the (not necessarily concave) value function (indirect utility) u(x, U ). In particular,
we show that the concave envelope of u(x, U ) is the value function u(x, Uc) of the utility
maximization problem for the concave envelope Uc of the utility function U . The two value
functions are shown to coincide if the underlying probability space is atomless. This allows
us to characterize the maximizers for several model classes explicitly.
Keywords Portfolio selection · Non-concave utility · Asymptotic elasticity ·
Non-convex optimization · Behavioural finance
JEL Classifications G11
1 Introduction
For an increasing and upper-semicontinuous function U on R+ satisfying a mild growth
condition, we study the problem
u(x, U ) := sup{E[U ( f )] | f ∈ C(x)}, (1.1)
where C(x) := { f ∈ L0+ | EQ[ f ] ≤ x} for a (pricing) measure Q ≈ P . Problem (1.1)
arises naturally when one studies utility maximization. The function U can be seen as a
(not necessarily concave) utility function describing the preferences of an agent in a financial
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market who is dynamically trading in the underlying discounted assets S. The random variable
f can be seen as the final position x +∫ T0 ϑd S resulting from a strategy ϑ with initial wealth
x . In complete markets where there is a unique equivalent martingale measure Q for S, the
elements in C(x) are those non-negative positions that can be associated to a trading strategy
starting from an initial endowment less than or equal to x . Then (1.1) is an abstract version
of the utility maximization problem of choosing a trading strategy such that the terminal
value f ∗ of the corresponding wealth process maximizes E[U ( f )] over all final outcomes
of competing strategies. The idea for this reduction from a dynamic to a static problem can
be traced back to Pliska [32]. The key advantage of the static formulation is that it describes
in a simple and transparent way the fundamental economic problem. Moreover, it allows us
to consider continuous- and discrete-time models in a unified way.
In the classical case where U is concave (which means that the agent is risk-averse)
and smooth (e.g. in C1), problem (1.1) and its solution are well known and we do not try
to discuss it here; see Biagini [11] for a detailed survey. However, there is considerable
empirical evidence (see for instance Tversky and Kahneman [40] and references therein)
that agents tend to switch between risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviour, depending on the
context. This leads to a partially convex (or convex–concave) utility function. Not necessarily
concave utility functions also appear in the context of manager compensation [18], portfolio
delegation [31], and strategic interaction among money managers [5].
In the case that U is not concave, problem (1.1) is more involved. There is a broad class
of models in which the non-concave problem has been studied by reducing it to the classical
concave case; see for instance Aumann and Perles [2], Carpenter[18], Berkelaar et al. [8],
Larsen [31], Carassus and Pham [15], Rieger [35], Basak and Makarov [5] and Bichuch and
Sturm [13]. At the other end of the scale, there are results on the existence of a solution in
a number of (incomplete) discrete-time settings where one does not necessarily have a fixed
pricing density, but the structure of the setup allows one to optimize directly over the set
of strategies; see Benartzi and Thaler [7], Bernard and Ghossoub [10], He and Zhou [23]
and Carassus and Rásonyi [16]. These two approaches provide fundamental results for a
particular type of setting, but their economic implications are surprisingly varying.1
The goal of this article is therefore to analyze (1.1) in a unified setting with one pric-
ing density. From a economic point of view, this allows us to understand the behavioural
predictions of non-concave parts in the utility function independently of the model-specific
assumptions. In this way, we can explain and generalize in a systematic way the results
obtained previously by other authors via ad hoc methods in specific frameworks. We also
study an example in continuous time with jumps in the price process where the problem
cannot be reduced to a concave one. We therefore not only unify but also extend the previous
results in the literature. In contrast to the existing literature, we also present a detailed analysis
of the value u(x, U ) as a function of the initial endowment x . This is a comparative static
analysis to investigate the sensitivity of the optimal value with respect to the key exogenous
variable “initial endowment”.
We present three main results. We first show necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a maximizer for u(x, U ), by using Fatou’s lemma in several dimensions due to
Balder [3]; we also describe several fundamental properties of the maximizers. In particular,
this requires the notion of asymptotic elasticity adapted to not necessarily concave utility
1 One example is the relation between the optimal final position and the pricing density. While they are anti-
comonotonic in the typical complete models in continuous time (Theorem B.1 in Jin and Zhou [27]), they
are not necessarily anti-comonotonic in complete models in discrete time. Non-concave parts in the utility
function might thus explain the pricing kernel puzzle in discrete time, but cannot do so in continuous time
(see Sect. 6 in Hens and Reichlin [24] for a detailed discussion).
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functions. We then study the value function u(x, U ). This is again an increasing and not
necessarily concave function, and its concave envelope is shown to coincide with u(x, Uc),
which explains the general relation between the problem u(x, U ) and the concavified problem
u(x, Uc). In the third part, we specialize the setup to the case that the underlying probability
space is atomless. Using rearrangement techniques, we show that u(x, U ) and u(x, Uc) then
coincide and we give a characterization of the maximizer for u(x, U ). We use our results to
discuss explicit examples exhibiting a number of new and unexpected phenomena.
Besides the articles already mentioned above, there is another important branch of the
literature that deals with non-concave problems. For more general preferences than expected
utility, Jin and Zhou [27], Carlier and Dana [17] and He and Zhou [22] have developed (under
the assumption that the distribution of d Q/d P is continuous) an approach via quantiles to
obtain the existence (and in some cases also the structure) of a maximizer.
The paper is structured as follows. We start in Sect. 2 with a precise definition of the
(not necessarily concave) utility function and its concave envelope. We then formulate the
optimization problem and give an illustrative example which provides some basic intuition.
In Sect. 3, we prove the existence and several properties of a maximizer. The value function
is analyzed in Sect. 4. Section 5 contains a detailed analysis of the case that the underlying
probability space is atomless. Finally, the appendices contain a number of well-known results
from convex analysis and non-smooth utility maximization which are used in the body of the
text.
2 Problem formulation and intuition
This section introduces the utility function, describes the framework and formulates the
optimization problem we are interested in. For a probability space (,F, P), let L0(,F, P)
(and L1(,F, P)) be the space of (equivalence classes of) F-measurable (and integrable)
random variables. The space L0+(,F, P) (and L1+(,F, P)) consists of all non-negative
elements of L0(,F, P) (and L1(,F, P)). Sometimes, we drop the dependence on the
probability space if it is clear from the context. For a random variable f ∈ L0(,F, P), we
use f ± = max(± f, 0) to denote the positive and negative parts of f .
Definition 2.1 A utility is a function U : (0,∞) → R with U (∞) > 0, which is non-
constant, increasing, upper-semicontinuous and satisfies the growth condition
lim
x→∞
U (x)
x
= 0. (2.1)
We only consider utility functions defined on the positive axis. To avoid any ambiguity, we
set U (x) = −∞ for x < 0 and define U (0) := limx↘0 U (x) and U (∞) := limx↗∞ U (x).
Note that we do not assume that U is concave, continuous or strictly increasing. In particular,
this also allows us to analyze goal-reaching problems initiated by Kulldorff [30]. In the
concave case, condition (2.1) is equivalent to the Inada condition at ∞ that U ′(∞) = 0. The
assumption U (∞) > 0 is technical but completely harmless, because adding a constant to U
does not change the preferences described by U . Moreover, note that the condition (2.1) and
the assumption U (∞) > 0 imply that there is always a concave function g : R → R∪{−∞}
satisfying g ≥ U .
Definition 2.2 The concave envelope Uc of U is the smallest concave function
Uc : R → R ∪ {−∞} such that Uc(x) ≥ U (x) holds for all x ∈ R.
123
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In order to formulate the optimization problem, we fix a probability space (,F, P) and
consider a probability measure Q equivalent to P with density ϕ := d Q/d P . We refer to Q
as pricing measure and to ϕ as pricing density (or pricing kernel). The set C(x) is defined
by
C(x) := { f ∈ L0+
∣
∣ EQ[ f ] ≤ x
}
.
In this paper, we study the problem
u(x, U ) := sup{E[U ( f )] | f ∈ C(x)}, (2.2)
where we define E[U ( f )] := −∞ if U−( f ) /∈ L1. An element f ∈ C(x) is optimal if
E[U ( f )] = u(x, U ). By a maximizer for u(x, U ), we mean an optimal element for the
problem (2.2). The function u(·, U ) is called the value function of the problem (2.2).
Remark 2.3 In behavioural finance, payoffs are often evaluated with respect to a (possibly
stochastic) reference point R, which means that the agent evaluates U ( f − R) rather than
U ( f ). If the reference point is deterministic, this can be embedded in our analysis by defining
a new utility U1(x) := U (x − R) and slightly modifying the arguments to account for the
new domain of the utility. If the reference point is stochastic, one can solve the problem by
maximizing first E[U (g)] subject to the constraint EQ[g] ≤ x − EQ[R] to get a maximizer
g∗ and then choose f ∗ := g + R. In the setting of a complete financial market, in particular,
this has a clear economic interpretation: the agent uses the amount EQ[R] to replicate the
stochastic reference point R and invests the remaining part x − EQ[R] as if he had a deter-
ministic reference point EQ[R]. In particular, having a reference point in a complete market
does not pose any significant difficulty.
2.1 Examples and intuition
We present here three representative models to illustrate how the pricing density and the
underlying probability space look in explicit settings.
Example 2.4 [Black–Scholes model] We fix some time horizon T ∈ (0,∞), a probability
space (,F, P) on which there is a standard Brownian motion W = (Wt )t≥0 and a (dis-
counted) market consisting of a savings account B ≡ 1, assumed to be constant, and one
stock S described by
d St = St (μt dt + σt dWt ), S0 = s0 > 0, σ > 0,
in the augmented filtration generated by W . The drift μ and the volatility σ are assumed to
be adapted and the market price of risk λ := μ/σ is assumed to satisfy ∫ T0 λ2s ds < ∞ P-a.s.
The unique martingale measure, if it exists, is defined by the pricing density
ϕ := d Q/d P = exp
(
− ∫ T0 λsdWs − 12
∫ T
0 λ
2
s ds
)
.
Example 2.5 [Geometric Poisson process] We consider some time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and a
probability space (,F, P) on which there is a Poisson process N = (Nt )t≥0 with constant
intensity λ > 0. Let (Ft )0≤t≤T be the augmented filtration generated by N . We consider a
(discounted) market consisting of a savings account B ≡ 1 and one risky stock S described
by
d St = αSt dt + σ St−d N˜t , S0 = s0 > 0, σ > −1, σ = 0, α/σ < λ,
where N˜t := Nt − λt is the compensated Poisson process. The unique martingale measure
is defined by ϕ := d Q/d P = e(λ−λ˜)T ( λ˜
λ
)NT for λ˜ := λ − α/σ .
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Example 2.6 [Complete model in discrete time] The classical example in discrete time is
the binomial model consisting of a savings account B ≡ 1, assumed to be constant, and one
stock S described by
S1k
S1k−1
= Yk =
{
1 + u with probability p
1 + d with probability 1 − p
for k =1, . . . , T in the filtration generated by Y . For u >0>d >−1, this model is complete;
the underlying probability space consists of finitely many atoms.
The utility functions studied in this paper are not necessarily concave. In order to provide
some intuition for these non-classical utility functions, we start with a motivating example
in which we compare Example 2.4 for μ = 0 and T = 1 and Example 2.6 for u = −d < 1
and T = 1. In both cases, it follows that ϕ = 1; in the first case, the underlying probability
space is atomless; in the second case, the underlying probability space consists of two atoms.
Example 2.7 shows that the two optimization problems are fundamentally different even
though the pricing densities are equal: the underlying probability space crucially affects the
optimization problem u(x, U ). Example 2.7 is of course pathological, but it is nevertheless
the simplest possible setting demonstrating both intuition and structure and abstracting them
from technical complexities.
Example 2.7 We consider the utility function U defined by
U (x) :=
{
0, 0 < x < 1,
1, x ≥ 1.
The concave envelope is given by Uc(x) = x on (0, 1) and Uc(x) = 1 for x ≥ 1; the goal is
therefore to maximize P[ f ≥ 1]. Moreover, we set ϕ ≡ 1.
For the concave problem u(x0, Uc), the random variable f ≡ x0 is optimal (as can be seen
by Jensen’s inequality, because ϕ ≡ 1) and gives u(x0, Uc) = Uc(x0) = x0. The maximizer
for u(x0, Uc) and the value function u(x0, Uc) are independent of the underlying probabilistic
structure.
For u(x0, U ) and x0 ∈ (0, 1), the payoff f ≡ x0 is not optimal; it is better to have 1 with
probability x0 while having 0 with probability 1−x0. If the probability space is atomless, one
can generate any probability distribution; this allows us to choose A ∈ F with P[A] = x0.
The element f = 1A gives the expected utility U (0)P[Ac]+U (1)P[A] = x0 which is equal
to u(x0, Uc). This shows that f is also a maximizer for u(x0, U ), since Uc ≥ U .
To illustrate the other extreme case, consider :={ω1, ω2}, F :=2 and
P[{ω1}] := P[{ω2}] := 12 . In this model, a set A with P[A] = x ∈ (0, 1) \ { 12 } can-
not be generated since the elements in L0+(,F) take at most two values, each with
probability 1/2, and so u(x, U ) = 1{x∈[1/2,1)}1/2 + 1{x≥1}.
The important insight from this example is that the underlying probability space crucially
affects the optimization problem u(x, U ). In the atomic case, the value function u(x, U ) is
not concave and (for some x) strictly below u(x, Uc). In the atomless case, the value function
u(x, U ) is concave and equal to u(x, Uc). Note that this has nothing to do with whether or
not the pricing density ϕ has a continuous distribution.
2.2 Some tools from convex analysis
This section summarizes several results which will be used throughout the paper. The proofs
can be found in Appendix A.
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Lemma 2.8 The concave envelope Uc of U is finite, continuous on (0,∞) and satisfies the
condition (2.1). The set {U < Uc} := { x ∈ R+|U (x) < Uc(x)} is open and its (countable)
connected components are bounded (open) intervals. Moreover, Uc is locally affine on the
set {U < Uc}, in the sense that it is affine on each of the above intervals.
A key tool to study the relation between U and Uc is the convex conjugate of U defined
by
J (y) := sup
x>0
{U (x) − xy}.
If U is not concave, then the concave envelope Uc is not strictly concave and the latter implies
that the function J is no longer smooth; we therefore work with the subdifferential which is
denoted by ∂ J for the convex function J and by ∂Uc for the concave function Uc (for precise
definitions, see Appendix A). The right- and left-hand derivatives of J are denoted by J ′+
and J ′−. The next lemma summarizes several properties which are proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.9 The function J is convex, decreasing, finite on (0,∞) and satisfies J (x) = ∞
for x < 0. The utility U and its concave envelope Uc have the same convex conjugate.
Moreover, it holds that
Uc(x) − xy = J (y) ⇐⇒ x ∈ −∂ J (y) ⇐⇒ y ∈ ∂Uc(x). (2.3)
In classical concave utility maximization, the asymptotic elasticity (AE) of the utility
function is introduced in Kramkov and Schachermayer [29]. They show that an upper bound
on AE(U ) is essentially necessary and sufficient to prove the existence of an optimizer.
Deelstra et al. [19] showed that this condition may also be formulated for the asymptotic
elasticity of the convex conjugate. This turns out to be useful for extending asymptotic
elasticity to the case when U is not necessarily concave. We define
AE0(J ) := lim sup
y→0
sup
q∈∂ J (y)
|q| y
J (y)
.
The condition AE0(J ) < ∞ has useful implications, which are summarized in the next
lemma. The equivalence goes back to Lemma 6.3 in Kramkov and Schachermayer [29]. In
the present form, it is proved in Lemma 4.1 of Deelstra et al. [19]. The proof of the second
part is deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 2.10 The asymptotic elasticity condition AE0(J ) < ∞ is equivalent to the existence
of two constants γ > 0 and y0 > 0 such that
J (μy) ≤ μ−γ J (y) for all μ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ (0, y0].
Moreover, if AE0(J ) < ∞ is satisfied, then there are two constants x0 > 0 and k > 0 such
that 0 ≤ Uc(x) ≤ kU (x) on (x0,∞).
In most applications, the utility U is strictly concave and differentiable on (x,∞) for x
large enough. For such utilities, the required asymptotic elasticity condition could also be
formulated in the classical way in terms of AE(U ) or AE(Uc), and the classical interpretation
of the condition via risk aversion then still applies.
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3 Existence and properties of a maximizer
The goal of this section is to prove the existence of a maximizer for u(x, U ). We also
discuss several properties such as uniqueness, first order condition for optimality, and co-
monotonicity of the maximizer and the pricing density.
To exclude the trivial case, it is necessary to assume that u(x, U ) < ∞ for some x > 0.
Even in the case of concave utilities, this is not sufficient to guarantee the existence of a
maximizer; see, for instance, Sect. 5 in Kramkov and Schachermayer [29] and Sect. 5 in
Biagini and Guasoni [12]. We introduce a stronger assumption.
Assumption 3.1 E[J (λϕ)] < ∞ for all λ > 0.
In the case that U = Uc, sufficient conditions for this assumption are u(x, Uc) < ∞
for some x > 0 and AE0(J ) < ∞. The next lemma extends this to the case when U is not
necessarily concave; it is proved in Appendix C.
Lemma 3.2 Under the assumption AE0(J ) < ∞, Assumption 3.1 is equivalent to
u(x, U ) < ∞ for some x > 0.
We now turn to the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. For all x0 ∈ (0,∞), there exists
some fˆ ∈ C(x0) such that u(x0, U ) = E[U ( fˆ )].
We work directly with a maximizing sequence ( f n) and try to get a suitable subsequence.
Due to the lack of concavity of U , Komlós-type arguments (see, for instance, Lemma 5.5
in Westray and Zheng [41]) do not work. For later applications, we prove a slightly more
general statement.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Fix a sequence xn → x > 0
and consider a sequence ( f n) with f n ∈ C(xn). There is some fˆ ∈ C(x) such that
lim sup
n→∞
E[U ( f n)] ≤ E[U ( fˆ )].
Proof (1) In the first part, we show that the family (U+( f n))n∈N is uniformly integrable. If
U is bounded from above, this is clear. Hence, we may assume U (∞) = ∞. The sequence
(xn) is bounded by x0, say, and it follows that
E
[
U+( f n)1{U+( f n)>α}
] ≤ E [(J+(λϕ) + f nϕλ) 1{U+( f n)>α}
]
≤ E [J+(λϕ)1{U+( f n)>α}
] + λx0.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for any λ > 0, we have
lim
α→∞ supn
E
[
J+(λϕ)1{U+( f n)>α}
] = 0.
Since the single random variable J+(λϕ) ∈ L1 is trivially uniformly integrable, we only
need to show that supn P[U+( f n) > α] → 0 for α → ∞. For this, fix a sequence αi → ∞
and let x˜ := inf{x > 0 | U (x) > 0} denote the first point where the utility becomes positive.
By definition of x˜ and x0, we have U+( f n) ≤ U (x˜ + f n) and f n + x˜ ∈ C(x0 + x˜). And
since we have by Lemma 3.2 that u(x, Uc) < ∞ for all x > 0, we get
123
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sup
n
P[U+( f n) > αi ] ≤ sup
n
E[U+( f n)]
αi
≤ u(x0 + x˜, U )
αi
−→ 0,
which completes the proof of the first part.
(2) By passing to a subsequence that realizes the lim sup, we can assume that the sequence
(E[U ( f n)]) converges, and we denote the limit by γ1. In the same way, by passing to a further
subsequence (again, relabelled as f n) that realizes lim sup E[ϕ f n], we can also assume that
(E[ϕ f n]) converges to some γ2 ≤ x . By part (1), we know that the family (U ( f n)+)n is
uniformly integrable; the same is trivially true for ((ϕ f n)−)n . By Corollary 3.9 of Balder
[3], it follows then that there exist gˆ1 ∈ L1 and gˆ2 ∈ L1 such that
E[gˆ1] ≥ γ1 and E[gˆ2] ≤ γ2, (3.1)
and for a.e. ω ∈ , there exists a subsequence nk(ω) such that
lim
k→∞ U ( f
nk (ω)(ω)) = gˆ1(ω) and lim
k→∞ ϕ(ω) f
nk (ω)(ω) = gˆ2(ω). (3.2)
Since ϕ > 0 P-a.s., we can define fˆ (ω) := gˆ2(ω)/ϕ(ω). This gives fˆ ϕ = gˆ2 and together
with (3.1), it follows that E[ϕ fˆ ] = E[gˆ2
] ≤ γ2 ≤ x, which means that fˆ ∈ C(x). Moreover,
it follows from (3.2) that
lim
k→∞ f
nk (ω) (ω) = lim
k→∞
ϕ(ω) f nk (ω) (ω)
ϕ(ω)
= gˆ2(ω)
ϕ(ω)
= fˆ (ω) .
Together with upper-semicontinuity of U and (3.2) we obtain
U ( fˆ (ω)) ≥ lim
k→∞ U ( f
nk (ω) (ω)) = gˆ1 (ω) .
Taking expectations and using (3.1) gives E[U ( fˆ )] ≥ E[gˆ1] ≥ γ1. We conclude that fˆ is a
maximizer since fˆ ∈ C(x). unionsq
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is now a direct application of Proposition 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.3 Consider a maximizing sequence ( f n)n∈N in C(x0). Since U is
increasing, we can assume that the constraint E[ϕ f n] = x0 is satisfied for each n ∈ N.
Proposition 3.4 gives some fˆ ∈ C(x0) such that E[U ( fˆ )] ≥ limn E[U ( f n)] = u(x0, U ),
which shows that fˆ is a maximizer. unionsq
Remark 3.5 Balder and Pistorius [4] provide an existence result for a multi-good consump-
tion problem with a not necessarily concave utility function on Rm+. They impose on the utility
function a growth condition that also involves the pricing density. By exploiting convex dual-
ity, our Assumption 3.1 relaxes their conditions and highlights that the classical assumptions
via asymptotic elasticity are sufficient for the existence of a maximizer also in the case with
one pricing measure and not necessarily concave utilities.
Having clarified the existence of a solution to u(x, U ), it is natural to ask about uniqueness.
Here the answer is negative: A maximizer for u(x, U ) is not necessarily unique. Similarly
to the case of concave utilities which are not strictly concave, we can manipulate the solu-
tion on those parts of dom(U ) where Uc is locally affine. This is illustrated in the next
example.
Example 3.6 Take a sufficiently rich model with ϕ ≡ 1 and consider a utility function
satisfying {U < Uc} = (a, b) ∪ (b, c) for which Uc is affine on (a, c). Jensen’s inequality
shows that f ≡ b is a maximizer for u(b, U ). But on the other hand, for a set A ∈ F
123
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satisfying P[A] = (c − b)/(c − a) (which exists by the richness of the model), it follows
that a1A + c1Ac is in C(b) and satisfies E[U (a1A + c1Ac )] = U (b), which means that
f ′ = a1A + c1Ac is also a maximizer. Lemma 5.9 below describes model classes where the
solution for u(x, U ) is unique.
In the sequel, our goal is to describe the properties of maximizers in more detail. We start
with the first order condition for optimality.
Lemma 3.7 Let U be continuously differentiable with {U < Uc} = ⋃ni=1(ai , bi ) for some
fixed n and let f ∗ be a maximizer for u(x, U ). Then there is λ > 0 such that f ∗ satisfies
U ′( f ∗) = λϕ on { f ∗ > 0}.
Proof Fix  > 0, define A := { f ∗ > } and consider
max E[U ( f )1A ] subject to f ∈ L0+, E[ f ϕ1A ] ≤ E[ f ∗ϕ1A ]. (3.3)
If there is some element fˆ in (3.3) with E[U ( fˆ )1A ] > E[U ( f ∗)1A ], the candidate
f ′ := fˆ 1A + f ∗1Ac is feasible for the problem u(x, U ) and satisfies E[U ( f ′)] > E[U ( f ∗)]
which contradicts the optimality of f ∗. Hence f ∗ also solves (3.3). Now fix some f ∈ L∞
and define fλ := f ∗ + λ ( f − c) 1A for c = E[ϕ f 1A ]/E[ϕ1A ]. First, note that
E[ϕ fλ1A ] = E[ϕ f ∗1A ] + λ
(
E[ϕ f 1A ] − cE[ϕ1A ]
) = E[ϕ f ∗1A ]
holds for every λ. Moreover, f ∈ L∞ implies fλ ≥ 0 on A for λ small. Hence fλ is a
feasible candidate for the problem (3.3) and this yields
0 ≥ lim sup
λ→0
E
[(
U ( fλ) − U ( f ∗)
)
1A
]
λ
.
Since U is continuously differentiable and concave on (bn,∞), U ′ is bounded on (,∞), and
using the mean value theorem, we find that (U ( fλ)−U ( f ∗))/λ is bounded by a constant on
A . Hence we may interchange limit and expectation to obtain 0 ≥ E
[
U ′ ( f ∗) ( f − c) 1A
]
.
Replacing f by − f shows that the expectation must vanish. Using the notation γ :=
E[U ′( f ∗)1A ]/E[ϕ1A ], we thus see that E[(U ′( f ∗)−ϕγ ) f 1A ] = 0 holds for all f ∈ L∞.
This implies U ′( f ∗) = ϕγ on A . The same approach for ˜ ∈ (0, ) gives U ′( f ∗) = ϕγ˜
on A˜ for some constant γ˜ . Since A ⊂ A˜ , we have that U ′( f ∗) = ϕγ = ϕγ˜ on A
and we infer γ = γ˜ . This can be done for any ˜ > 0 and we obtain U ′( f ∗) = ϕγ on⋃
>0 A = { f ∗ > 0}, which proves the assertion. unionsq
In financial economics, there is a broad strand of literature (see for instance Jackwerth [25]
and Beare [6]) that analyzes the pricing density in financial markets. From an equilibrium
perspective, this boils down to an analysis of the relation between the pricing density d Q/d P
and the optimal final position f ∗ of a single agent. In the classical case where U is concave,
the marginal utility U ′ is decreasing and the first order condition U ′( f ∗) = λd Q/d P hence
gives a decreasing relation between f ∗ and d Q/d P . This means that f ∗ and d Q/d P are
anti-comonotonic (see Definition 4.82 in Föllmer and Schied [21]). Dybvig [20] considers a
finite-dimensional setup and shows, by using rearrangement techniques, that the decreasing
relation between f ∗ and d Q/d P also holds for not necessarily concave utility functions if
all states ω ∈  have the same probability. The economic intuition for this result is that it is
(cost-)efficient to have a higher payoff in those states where the pricing density is low. Jin and
Zhou [27] and Carlier and Dana [17] show that the decreasing relation between the optimal
final position and d Q/d P also holds for more general preferences if the pricing density
has a continuous distribution. However, this result cannot be generalized to an arbitrary
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combination of pricing density and underlying probability space as we illustrate in the next
example.
Example 3.8 Take  = {ω1, ω2}, F = 2, P[{ω1}] = 2/3, define the pricing measure by
Q[{ω1}] = 3/4 and consider the utility function
U (x) :=
{
(x − 1)1/3, x ≥ 1,
−(1 − x)2/3, x < 1.
The problem u(1, U ) can be solved explicitly for this function U (see Theorem 3.1 in Bernard
and Ghossoub [10]), and it turns out that f ∗ defined by f ∗(ω1) := 10/9 and f ∗(ω2) := 2/3
is the optimal final position for u(1, U ). It follows that f ∗ and ϕ are not anti-comonotonic.
Remark 3.9 (1) By extending, for the case of expected utility, the results of Jin and Zhou
[27] and Carlier and Dana [17], it is shown below in Corollary 5.6 that ϕ and the maximizer
f ∗ for u(x, U ) are anti-comonotonic if the probability space is atomless.
(2) At first glance, Example 3.8 seems to contradict the main result of Rieger [34] who
claims to generalize the above result in Dybvig [20] to a general pricing density. However,
a closer inspection of the setup and the results in Rieger [34] shows that the optimization
problem (Definitions 2.10 and 2.11 and Theorem 2.12 there) is not of the same classical
form as our problem (2.2). Rieger [34] considers probability distributions where the pricing
density ϕ and the final payoff f may have any joint distribution (in contrast to our setup,
where only those joint distributions are allowed which can be actually supported by the
underlying probability space), and the constraint is formulated in terms of the covariance
between the payoff and the pricing density. In the context of Example 3.8, this allows one to
choose a payoff f via the joint distribution
P[ϕ = 3/4, f = 10/9] = P[ϕ = 9/8, f = 10/9] = P[ϕ = 9/8, f = 2/3] = 1/3,
which is not possible in our framework.
One can think of the approach in Rieger [34] as allowing for randomized payoffs. In
the above example, instead of a fixed payoff f (ω2), one is allowed to choose a lottery
with outcomes 10/9 and 2/3 with probability 0.5 each. For mathematical purposes, having
randomized payoffs is very useful since it allows one to prove anti-comonotonicity of f ∗
and ϕ. But if the payoffs must be generated by trading in a specified financial market, the
underlying probabilistic structure matters, and allowing randomized payoffs does not match
up well with the given financial problem.
(3) Instead of the (primal) problem to maximize the expected utility, one can also look at
a dual problem of minimizing over payoffs f the cost EQ[ f ] for a given value of E[U ( f )].
Since the expected utility depends only on the distribution of f , this problem is closely related
to finding the cheapest price to generate a given distribution. In Dybvig [20], this is called the
distributional price of f or of its distribution, and a payoff is called cost-efficient if any other
payoff that generates the same distribution costs at least as much. The ideas of Dybvig [20]
have recently been revisited, formalized and extended in Bernard and Boyle [9]. One central
result there is to show that a payoff is cost-efficient if the payoff and the pricing density are
anti-comonotonic. Example 3.8 above shows that the converse direction is not true in general:
A pricing density ϕ and a cost-efficient payoff are not necessarily anti-comonotonic.
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4 The value function
In Sect. 3, we have considered u(x, U ) for a fixed x > 0. This section analyzes how
the optimal value u(x, U ) depends on x . Not surprisingly, the value function u(x, U ) is
again increasing, upper-semicontinuous and not necessarily concave (upper-semicontinuity
is proved below in Proposition 4.2). So the value function itself has similar properties as
the utility U and, as in the case of U , we are interested in the concave envelope of u(x, U ).
The first important result is that the concave envelope of u(x, U ) is (essentially) given by
u(x, Uc). This gives a general relation between u(x, U ) and u(x, Uc).
Theorem 4.1 Take any utility function U with convex conjugate J . If Assumption 3.1 is
satisfied, then the value function u(x, Uc) and the concave envelope of u(x, U ) coincide on
(0,∞) and we have
j (λ) := E[J (λϕ)] = sup
x>0
{u(x, U ) − xλ}, λ > 0. (4.1)
The relation (4.1) states that j is the conjugate of the value function u(x, U ). In the
concave case, the corresponding result from the literature is more general since j there is
defined as an infimum (over pricing measures) in a dual problem; see for instance Lemma
3.4 of Kramkov and Schachermayer [29]. However, a closer inspection of that proof there
shows that concavity is not needed for our present case with a single pricing measure. More
precisely, Kramkov and Schachermayer [29] (or Westray and Zheng [41] for the nonsmooth
case) determine the conjugate of the value function in a setting with infinitely many pricing
measures. Then concavity of the utility function U is (essentially) used to apply the minimax
theorem in order to exchange the supremum over (bounded) payoffs and the infimum over
pricing densities. In the present case with one single pricing density, this step is not necessary
and one can proceed without concavity. For completeness, we carry out the details.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (1) To show (4.1), we start with the claim that
lim
n→∞ supf ∈Cn
E[U ( f ) − f λϕ] = sup
x>0
{u(x, U ) − xλ}, (4.2)
where Cn := { f ∈ L0+ | 0 ≤ f ≤ n} is the ball of radius n in the positive orthant of L0. For
“≤”, note that the left-hand side of (4.2) is an increasing limit in n; so we have to show that
for each n and each f ∈ Cn ,
E[U ( f ) − f λϕ] ≤ sup
x>0
{u(x, U ) − xλ}.
To do that, fix f and define x∗ := E[ϕ f ]. For x∗ = 0, we get E[ f ϕ] = 0, hence f ≡ 0,
and so E[U ( f ) − f λϕ] = U (0) ≤ u(x, U ) − xλ + xλ for any x > 0. This gives the
above inequality, and so we consider the case where x∗ > 0. By definition of x∗, we have
f ∈ C(x∗) and it follows that
E[U ( f ) − f λϕ] ≤ u(x∗, U ) − x∗λ ≤ supx>0{u(x, U ) − xλ}.
This proves (4.2).
(2) To get (4.1) from (4.2), we now want to interchange supremum and expectation on
the left-hand side of (4.2) and then let n → ∞. For each n, a measurable selection argument
(see Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border [1]) shows that we can choose a measurable
selector x∗(ω) ∈ L0+ such that
sup
0≤x≤n
{U (x) − xλϕ(ω)} = U (x∗(ω)) − x∗(ω)λϕ(ω).
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With Jn(λ) := sup0≤x≤n{U (x) − xλ} ≥ U (n) − nλ, it thus follows that we have indeed
sup
f ∈Cn
E[U ( f ) − f λϕ] = E[Jn(λϕ)]. (4.3)
But Jn is increasing in n and dominated by J , so in view of (4.2) and (4.3), we have to show
for (4.1) that limn→∞ E[Jn(λϕ)] ≥ E[J (λϕ)]. Because of J±n → J± and Fatou’s lemma,
it is sufficient to show that (J−n (λϕ))n∈N is uniformly integrable. Since Jn is increasing in n,
J−n is decreasing in n and J−1 (λϕ) ≤ |U (1)| + λϕ is an integrable upper bound for J−n (λϕ),
n ∈ N.
(3) It remains to prove that u(x, Uc) and the concave envelope of u(x, U ) coincide on
(0,∞). Note first from Lemma 2.9 that U and Uc have the same convex conjugate J so that
applying (4.1) for U and Uc implies that j is the conjugate of both u(x, U ) and u(x, Uc). Thus
also their biconjugates coincide. But applying part (iii) of Lemma A.1 to u(x, Uc) gives that
u(x, Uc) is equal to its biconjugate. This shows that u(x, Uc) is the biconjugate of u(x, U ).
So applying part (iii) of Lemma A.1 now to u(x, U ) (which is upper-semicontinuous due
to Proposition 4.2 below) finally gives that u(x, Uc) and the concave envelope of u(x, U )
coincide on (0,∞). unionsq
Example 2.7 shows that the value function u(x, U ) is not continuous in general. If, how-
ever, the utility function is continuous, then also the value function u(x, U ) is continuous.
Proposition 4.2 Let Assumption 3.1 be satisfied. Then the value function u(x, U ) is upper-
semicontinuous. If U is, in addition, continuous, then the value function u(x, U ) is continuous
on (0,∞).
Proof For upper-semicontinuity, consider a sequence xn ↘ x ∈ (0,∞) and, using Theorem
3.3, denote the maximizer for u(xn, U ) by f n . Proposition 3.4 gives fˆ ∈ C(x) satisfying
lim sup
n→∞
u(xn, U ) = lim sup
n→∞
E[U ( f n)] ≤ E[U ( fˆ )] ≤ u(x, U ),
which finishes the proof of upper-semicontinuity for x ∈ (0,∞). Moreover, it is known from
the literature (Theorem 6 of Siorpaes [38]) that u(xn, Uc) ↘ Uc(0) for xn ↘ 0 and this
implies u(xn, U ) ↘ U (0) for xn ↘ 0 since Uc(0) = U (0) ≤ u(x, U ) ≤ u(x, Uc) for all
x > 0.
It remains to show the lower-semicontinuity of u(x, U ) if U is continuous. Fix a sequence
xn ↗ x0 ∈ (0,∞) and a random variable f0 ∈ C(x0) with U−( f0) ∈ L1. Then we construct
a sequence ( fn)n with fn ∈ C(xn), fn ↗ f0 and U−( fn) ∈ L1 for all n. Dominated con-
vergence for (U−( fn))n (with the upper bound U−( f1)) and Fatou’s lemma for (U+( fn))n
give
E[U ( f0)] ≤ lim inf
n→∞ E[U ( fn)] ≤ lim infn→∞ u(xn, U ).
The result follows by taking the supremum over f0 ∈ C(x). unionsq
5 Results for an atomless model
In this section, we specialize our setup to the case when the underlying probability space
is atomless. This is equivalent to assuming that the probability space supports a continuous
distribution (see Definition A.26 and Proposition A.27 in Föllmer and Schied [21] for a
precise definition and equivalent formulations). One special example of this occurs when
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we have a pricing density with a continuous distribution. This case often appears in the
literature; see for instance Larsen [31]. It is shown there in the setting of the Black–Scholes
model that u(x, Uc) = u(x, U ) and that the utility maximization problem u(x, U ) can be
reduced to the concavified problem u(x, Uc). However, the assumption that the distribution
of ϕ is continuous is not very satisfactory from an economic point of view since it does not
provide any structural explanation for the results. Also, from a mathematical point of view,
the assumption is not very elegant since it might be tedious or even impossible to verify
the continuity of the distribution. Carassus and Pham [15] and Bichuch and Sturm [13] use
techniques from Malliavin calculus (and additional assumptions) to show the continuity of
the distribution of ϕ in Example 2.4; we also present an example with jumps in the price
process where the underlying probability space is atomless and the distribution of the pricing
density is not continuous.
The main result of this section is that u(x, U ) = u(x, Uc) already holds if the underlying
probability space is atomless. This unifies and generalizes the existing results in the litera-
ture, and the proof also provides an economically intuitive explanation. Note also that the
assumption of having an atomless probability space is easily verifiable in applications.
Theorem 5.1 Let (,F, P) be atomless. Then it holds that
u(x, U ) = u(x, Uc) for all x > 0. (5.1)
The problem u(x, U ) admits a maximizer if and only if the concavified problem u(x, Uc)
admits a maximizer. Every maximizer for the problem u(x, U ) also maximizes the concavified
problem u(x, Uc).
While every maximizer for u(x, U ) is also a maximizer for u(x, Uc), the opposite con-
clusion is not true in general.
Example 5.2 A maximizer for u(x, Uc) is in general not a maximizer for u(x, U ). Fix ϕ ≡ 1
and x ∈ {U < Uc}. Doing nothing, i.e., f ≡ x , is optimal for u(x, Uc), but is not optimal
for u(x, U ). Lemma 5.7 below describes model classes where a solution for u(x, Uc) is also
a solution for u(x, U ).
As we see below in Lemma 5.7, Theorem 5.1 is straightforward and (essentially) known
in the case in which the distribution of ϕ is continuous. In general, it is therefore a natural
idea to approximate possible mass points in that distribution by continuous distributions.
Such an approach is possible, but it requires some new and involved convergence results as
well as additional restrictive integrability conditions on ϕ (see Sect. 3.3 of Reichlin [33]).
We use another approach based on rearrangement techniques that works without additional
assumptions on ϕ. This approach is based on a slightly stronger result.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose that (,F, P) is atomless. For any candidate f ∈ C(x), there
exists f ∗ ∈ C(x) satisfying { f ∗ ∈ {U < Uc}} = ∅ and
E[U ( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f )] ≥ E[U ( f )], (5.2)
where the last inequality is strict if and only if P[ f ∈ {U < Uc}] > 0.
This proposition is inspired by Rieger [35] who solved the case of a pricing density with
a continuous distribution. In addition to giving a rigorous proof, our contribution compared
to Rieger [35] is to prove the statement without any assumption on the distribution of ϕ. This
is the crucial step in extending the existing results in the literature. Let us first explain the
idea. Fix a utility U with {U < Uc} = (a, b) and choose x ∈ (a, b). We consider the random
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Fig. 1 concentrate all the weight in (a, b) on the corners a and b
variable f ≡ x . The idea is to use rearrangement techniques to construct f ∗ ∈ C(x) with
the same expected concavified utility and no probability weight in {U < Uc}. The method
to achieve this is to concentrate all the weight on a and b (see Fig. 1), i.e., to choose f ∗ of
the form f ∗ = a1A + b1Ac . The set A ∈ F has to be chosen in such a way that the agent
can still afford the claim.
In the special case ϕ ≡ 1, a feasible choice for A is any set satisfying P[A] = b−xb−a . For
an arbitrary ϕ, the condition on A is a bit more involved; in particular, we have to put the
“expensive” states (ϕ(ω) high) on a and the “cheap” states (ϕ(ω) low) on b. For a general
utility U with {U < Uc} = ⋃i (ai , bi ) as in Lemma 2.8, every set {ω ∈  | f ∈ (ai , bi )} is
rearranged separately in a similar way by concentrating the weight on ai and bi . For ω ∈ 
with f (ω) ∈ {U = Uc}, the random variable f ∗(ω) := f (ω) is not changed.
Proof of Proposition 5.3 We split the proof into several steps; the plan is as follows. In
the first part, we start with some preliminary remarks and define the sets needed for the
construction of f ∗. We then construct f ∗ and show that f ∗ ∈ C(x) in the second part. (5.2)
is shown in the third part. The final “if and only if” statement is a direct consequence of (5.2).
(1) It is shown in Lemma 2.8 that the concave envelope Uc is locally affine on {U < Uc}
and that {U < Uc} = ⋃i (ai , bi ) for some ai and bi . We define
Si := {ω ∈  | f (ω) ∈ (ai , bi )}
and S := ⋃i Si = { f ∈ {U < Uc}}, which means that S contains all the states where
f takes values in the non-concave part of U . For ω ∈ Si , the weight λ(ω) is defined
by λ(ω) := (bi − f (ω))/(bi − ai ), and since f (ω) ∈ (ai , bi ) by definition of Si , it
holds that λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1). An elementary calculation shows that for ω ∈ Si , we have (by
construction)
f (ω) = λ(ω)ai + (1 − λ(ω))bi . (5.3)
The idea is now to decompose every set Si into two parts. Because of the atomless
structure of the probability space, there exists (Föllmer and Schied [21, Lemma A.28])
a random variable U with a uniform distribution on (0, 1) and an increasing function
qϕ on (0, 1) such that ϕ = qϕ(U) holds P-a.s. (qϕ is a quantile function of ϕ). Since
fi (s) := P[Si ∩ {U < s}] is a continuous function from [0, 1] to [0, P[Si ]], we find si
such that fi (si ) = E[(1 − λ)1Si ]. We now define the disjoint sets
Si1 := Si ∩ {U ≥ si } and Si2 := Si ∩ {U < si } .
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Note that Si1 ∪ Si2 = Si , which gives P[Si1] = P[Si ] − P[Si2]. Moreover, due to the
definition of si , we can express the probabilities of Si2 and Si1 in terms of Si and λ.
More precisely, we have
P[Si2] = fi (si ) = E[(1 − λ)1Si ] and P[Si1] = E[λ1Si ]. (5.4)
Finally, note that U < si on Si2 and U ≥ si on Si1 by definition. Since ϕ = qϕ(U) is an
increasing function of U , we have
sup
ω∈Si2
ϕ(ω) ≤ inf
ω∈Si1
ϕ(ω). (5.5)
(2) The modified random variable f ∗ is defined by
f ∗ (ω) :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
f (ω) , ω ∈ Sc,
ai , ω ∈ Si1,
bi , ω ∈ Si2.
The measurability of f implies that Si = { f ∈ (ai , bi )} ∈ F , and the measurability of
U implies that {U ≥ si } ∈ F ; so also the intersection Si1 = Si ∩ {U ≥ si } is in F . Since
{ f ∗ ≤ x} can be written in terms of f and Si1, we get measurability of f ∗. We show
below in step 4) that
ai E[ϕ1Si1 ] + bi E[ϕ1Si2 ] ≤ E[ϕ(λai + (1 − λ)bi )1Si ], (5.6)
which means that E[ϕ f ∗1Si ] ≤ E[ϕ f 1Si ] holds for every i . Since we have f ∗ = f
on Sc = (⋃i Si )c, the assumption f ∈ C(x) then gives E[ϕ f ∗] ≤ E[ϕ f ] ≤ x, which
means that f ∗ ∈ C(x).
(3) For the first equality in (5.2) that E[U ( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f ∗)], note that f ∗ = f on Sc by the
definition of f ∗. On S = ⋃i Si , the definition of f ∗ gives f ∗ ∈ {ai , bi } on Si . By Lemma
2.8, the constants ai and bi are also in {U = Uc}; hence we arrive at f ∗(ω) ∈ {U = Uc}
for all ω ∈ . The latter implies E[U ( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f ∗)]. For the second equality in
(5.2) that E[Uc( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f )], we first show that E[Uc( f )1Si ] = E[Uc( f ∗)1Si ]
holds for every i . This needs four ingredients. In the first step, we apply (5.3) to rewrite
f in terms of ai , bi and λ. Second, we use that the concave envelope Uc is affine on
[ai , bi ] and the fact that λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1). We then apply (5.4) and finally, we rewrite the
resulting convex combination in terms of f ∗. Following these steps, we obtain
E[Uc( f )1Si ] = E[Uc(λai + (1 − λ)bi )1Si ]
= Uc(ai )E[λ1Si ] + Uc(bi )E[(1 − λ)1Si ]
= Uc(ai )P[Si1] + Uc(bi )P[Si2]
= E[Uc( f ∗)1Si ]
for every i . Recall that S = ⋃i Si holds by definition and that f = f ∗ on the complement
Sc by the definition of f ∗. Monotone convergence and the above equality show that
U±c ( f ) ∈ L1 if and only if U±c ( f ∗) ∈ L1 and that
E[Uc( f )1S] =
∑
i
E[Uc( f )1Si ] =
∑
i
E[Uc( f ∗)1Si ] = E[Uc( f ∗)1S]
if U±c ( f ) ∈ L1. In all cases, we obtain E[Uc( f )] = E[Uc( f ∗)]. The inequality in (5.2)
holds because Uc ≥ U , and the “if and only if” part is clear from the definition of
{U < Uc}.
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(4) Finally, to show (5.6), recall that P[Si2] = E[(1 − λ)1Si ]. Subtracting E[(1 − λ)1Si2 ]
on both sides gives
E[λ1Si2 ] = E[(1 − λ)1Si ] − E[(1 − λ)1Si2 ] = E[(1 − λ)1Si1 ].
This equality can be combined with (5.5) to deduce
E[ϕλ1Si2 ] ≤ sup
ω∈Si2
ϕ(ω)E[λ1Si2 ] ≤ inf
ω∈Si1
ϕ(ω)E[(1 − λ)1Si1 ] ≤ E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si1 ].
Because ai ≤ bi , the product of the positive terms E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si1 ] − E[ϕλ1Si2 ] and
bi − ai is again positive, and this can be rewritten as
ai E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si1 ] + bi E[ϕλ1Si2 ] ≤ ai E[ϕλ1Si2 ] + bi E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si1 ]. (5.7)
Finally, rewriting ai E[ϕ1Si1 ] + bi E[ϕ1Si2 ] in terms of λ, applying (5.7) and rewriting
the resulting terms again in a compact form yields
ai E[ϕ1Si1 ] + bi E[ϕ1Si2 ]
= ai E[ϕλ1Si1 ] + ai E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si1 ] + bi E[ϕλ1Si2 ] + bi E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si2 ]
≤ ai E[ϕλ1Si1 ] + ai E[ϕλ1Si2 ] + bi E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si1 ] + bi E[ϕ(1 − λ)1Si2 ]
= E[ϕ(λai + (1 − λ)bi )1Si ],
which finishes the proof of (5.6). unionsq
Theorem 5.1 follows now directly from Proposition 5.3, as follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 The inequality “≤” for (5.1) follows from U ≤ Uc. For “≥”, we start
with some f ∈ C(x). Proposition (5.3) gives f ∗ ∈ C(x) with E[U ( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f )]. The
inequality “≥” follows since f ∈ C(x) is arbitrary.
For the second part, we first assume that there is a maximizer f ∈ C(x) for the problem
u(x, U ). Then (5.1) gives
u(x, U ) = E[U ( f )] ≤ E[Uc( f )] ≤ u(x, Uc) = u(x, U ),
which shows that f also maximizes u(x, Uc). Conversely, assume that f maximizes u(x, Uc).
Proposition 5.3 gives f ∗ ∈ C(x) satisfying E[U ( f ∗)] = E[Uc( f ∗)] =E[Uc( f )]. We
deduce that
u(x, U ) = u(x, Uc) = E[Uc( f )] = E[Uc( f ∗)] = E[U ( f ∗)],
which shows that f ∗ is a maximizer for u(x, U ). unionsq
Remark 5.4 Looking at the proof of Proposition 5.3 more closely shows that we have not
directly used the fact that the U is defined on R+. The essential ingredients are that Uc exists
and that {U < Uc} can be written as a countable (finite) union of bounded intervals. The
proof is also valid for utilities defined on R if these two assumptions are satisfied.
The first message of Theorem 5.1 is that, in the atomless case, any solution for the opti-
mization problem u(x, U ) also solves the concavified one, which in turn is well understood
(see, for instance, Bouchard et al. [14] and Westray and Zheng [41]). In particular, the struc-
ture of the solution for the concavified problem is known. In this way, Theorem 5.1 can be
used to describe explicitly the structure of all solutions to the optimization problem u(x, U ).
Theorem 5.1 also says that the existence of a maximizer for the concavified optimization
problem already guarantees the existence of a maximizer for the problem u(x, U ). Since
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the conditions for existence for the concavified problem are slightly weaker than those in
Theorems 3.3 and 5.1 can be used to slightly relax the assumptions in the present atomless
case, as follows.
Corollary 5.5 Suppose that (,F, P) is atomless and that u(x, U ) < ∞ for some x > 0.
Then there exists x˜ ∈ (0,∞] such that for x ∈ (0, x˜), the problem u(x, U ) has a maximizer
and every maximizer satisfies f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λ∗ϕ) for some λ∗ > 0. If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied,
then x˜ = ∞.
Proof The argument is a combination of known results on non-smooth utility maximization,
non-smooth versions of results of Jin et al. [28], and Theorem 5.1. For completeness, we
summarize the material on non-smooth utility maximization in Appendix B.
Proposition B.1 shows that there is x˜ ∈ (0,∞] such that for x ∈ (0, x˜), the concavified
optimization problem u(x, Uc) has a maximizer. By Theorem 5.1, the problem u(x, U ) then
also admits a solution f ∗ which also maximizes u(x, Uc). The particular form of f ∗ then
follows from Proposition B.1. If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, the statements follow in much
the same way by using Proposition B.3 instead of Proposition B.1. unionsq
For models with an atomless underlying probability space, Corollary 5.5 shows that any
maximizer for u(x, U ) satisfies f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λϕ) for some λ ≥ 0. But J is a convex function
and the subdifferential is monotone in the sense that J ′+(z1) ≤ J ′−(x) ≤ J ′+(x) ≤ J ′−(z2)
when z1 < x < z2 (see part (iv) of Lemma A.1). This implies that f ∗ and λϕ are anti-
comonotonic. If Uc is strictly increasing, the first order condition implies λ > 0 and we
obtain:
Corollary 5.6 Let Uc be strictly increasing, let (,F, P) be atomless and let f ∗ be a
maximizer for u(x, U ) derived in Corollary 5.5. Then f ∗ and ϕ are anti-comonotonic.
In some examples, the distribution of the pricing density ϕ is continuous. This simplifies
several arguments and allows for further results. Larsen [31], Carassus and Pham [15] and
Rieger [35] consider a framework with {U < Uc} = ⋃Ni=1(ai , bi ) for a fixed N and argue
that a maximizer for u(x, Uc) also maximizes u(x, U ). The arguments of Larsen [31] can
easily be adapted to our slightly more general case.
Lemma 5.7 Let ϕ have a continuous distribution and let f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λϕ) be a maximizer
f ∗ for u(x, Uc). Then f ∗ is also a maximizer for u(x, U ).
Proof Let f ∗ be a maximizer for the concavified problem u(x, Uc). If
P[ f ∗ ∈ {U < Uc}] = 0, (5.8)
it follows that u(x, U ) ≤ u(x, Uc) = E[Uc( f ∗)] = E[U ( f ∗)] ≤ u(x, U ) which means
that f ∗ is also a maximizer for u(x, U ). To prove (5.8), note that f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λϕ) for some
λ ≥ 0. The case λ = 0 gives f ∗ = −J ′+(0) and the result follows from Lemma A.2. So
consider λ > 0. It is shown in Lemma 2.8 that Uc is locally affine on {U < Uc}. So if
f ∗(ω) ∈ {U < Uc}, then ∂Uc( f ∗(ω)) = {λϕ(ω)} by Lemma 2.9. But if Uc is affine on an
interval (a, b) with slope c, then it follows that J is not differentiable in c since x ∈ −∂ J (c)
for x ∈ (a, b). This gives
{ f ∗ ∈ {U < Uc}} ⊆ {ω ∈  | J is not differentiable in λϕ(ω)}.
The function J is finite and convex on (0,∞) and thus differentiable there except for at most
countably many points yi , i ∈ N. This yields (5.8) since
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P[{ω ∈  | J (·) is not differentiable in λϕ(ω)}] =
∑
i
P[{λϕ = yi }] = 0,
where continuity of the distribution of ϕ is used in the last equality. unionsq
Remark 5.8 (1) If the distribution of ϕ is continuous, Theorem 5.1 follows directly from
Lemma 5.7.
(2) Lemma 5.7 is also useful for the more general case with more than one pricing measure.
In concave utility maximization, one central property is that the solution to the problem with
more than one pricing measure and the utility Uc can be obtained by working with only one
well-chosen (generalized) pricing measure (see, for instance, Kramkov and Schachermayer
[29] for details). If the distribution of the (generalized) pricing density is continuous, it
follows as in Lemma 5.7 that the solution f ∗ to the problem with this pricing measure
satisfies P[ f ∗ ∈ {U < Uc}] = 0. This implies that it is also the solution to the problem
with multiple pricing measures and the utility U . This idea is used in He and Zhou [22] for
one particular model. Bichuch and Sturm [13] explore the idea more thoroughly and derive
conditions under which it can be applied for specific classes of models.
(3) The case with (infinitely) many pricing measures having not necessarily continuous
distributions is more subtle. As in part 2), the solution f ∗ for Uc satisfies f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λ∗ϕ)
and E[ϕ f ∗] = x for a particular dual object ϕ. However, Westray and Zheng [42] show that
these conditions are in general not sufficient for optimality of f ∗ in the concavified problem.
This is in contrast to the case with one pricing measure where these assumptions are sufficient
for optimality and this is the reason why the proof of Proposition 5.3 cannot be extended
directly to the case with many pricing measures.
In a similar way as in Lemma 5.7, we also get uniqueness for the maximizer for u(x, U )
provided that Uc is strictly increasing.
Lemma 5.9 Let Uc be strictly increasing, let ϕ have a continuous distribution and let f ∗ be
a maximizer for u(x, U ) derived in Corollary 5.5. Then the maximizer is P-a.s. unique.
Proof Let fi ∈ −∂ J (λiϕ) for i = 1, 2 be maximizers for u(x, U ). If λ1 > λ2, it follows
from part (ix) of Lemma A.1 that f1 ≤ f2. Since fi ∈ {U = Uc} P-a.s. and U is strictly
increasing there, we deduce that f1 = f2 P-a.s. Suppose now λ1 = λ2. If J is differentiable
in λ1ϕ(ω), then ∂ J (λ1ϕ(ω)) is a singleton and hence f1(ω) = f2(ω). But this implies
{ f1 = f2} ⊆
{
ω ∈  | J (·) is not differentiable in λ∗ϕ(ω)} ,
and the latter has probability 0 since the distribution of ϕ is continuous. unionsq
We finally discuss one example which makes the advantages of Theorem 5.1 transparent.
Example 5.10 We consider some time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) and a probability space (,F, P)
on which there are a Poisson process (Nt )t≥0 with intensity λ > 0 and a Brownian motion
(Wt )t≥0. Let (Ft )0≤t≤T be the augmented filtration generated by N and W . We consider
a (discounted) market consisting of a savings account B ≡ 1 and two risky stocks S1, S2
described by
d S1t = αS1t dt + σ1S1t−d N˜t , S10 = 1, σ1 > −1, σ1 = 0, α/σ1 < λ,
d S2t = σ2S2t dWt , S20 = 1, σ2 > 0,
where N˜t := Nt − λt is the compensated Poisson process. This model defines a complete
financial market and the unique martingale measure is defined by d Q/d P = e(λ−λ˜)T ( λ˜
λ
)NT
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for λ˜ := λ − α/σ (for details, see for instance Sect. 10.6.1 in Jeanblanc et al. [26]). So
instead of maximizing expected utility over dynamic strategies in the market, we may as well
solve (2.2) for ϕ = d Q/d P . The underlying probability space is atomless, so it follows from
Theorem 5.1 that u(x, U ) = u(x, Uc). However, the distribution of ϕ is not continuous, so
u(x, U ) cannot be solved directly via Lemma 5.7.
Note that the martingale measure here is the same as in Example 2.5 even though the
financial markets are not identical. Looking at the static problem (2.2), the difference is
reflected in the underlying probability space. Here it is atomless while it is not atomless in
Example 2.5; the set {NT = 0} is an atom in that case. The economic interpretation is as
follows. The market from Example 2.5 consisting only of B and S1 defines a complete market
in continuous time in which one cannot generate an arbitrary probability distribution. An
agent having a utility U can therefore not always generate the same expected utility as an
agent with the concave utility Uc. Introducing as above the third asset S2 does not increase the
optimal expected utility for the agent with the utility Uc since d Q/d P does not change; his
optimal final position is therefore the same as before. However, the new asset increases the
optimal expected utility for the agent with the utility U . Because the underlying space is now
atomless and the financial market is complete, the agent is able to generate by self-financing
trading any distribution; in this way the agent generates the same optimal expected utility as
the agent with the concave utility Uc.
To put the present section into perspective, let us finally discuss some results in the lit-
erature which belong to the class of models analyzed here. Berkelaar et al.[8], Larsen [31],
Carassus and Pham [15], Rieger[35] and Basak and Makarov [5] consider utility maximiza-
tion problems for not necessarily concave utility functions under the assumption that ϕ has
a continuous distribution and use (sometimes implicitly) the argument given in Lemma 5.7.
In addition, Carassus and Pham [15] consider Example 2.4 for μ = 0 and use dynamic pro-
gramming tools to show that a particular optimization problem satisfies u(x, U ) = u(x, Uc).
Our Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.5 provide a unified derivation and perspective for these
results. Moreover, our result also allows us to deal with other examples, such as Example
5.10, that are not possible to solve with the existing results in the literature.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of utility maximization from terminal wealth for a not
necessarily concave utility function and for a budget set given by a single pricing measure.
This is motivated by several applications in finance such as manager compensation, portfolio
delegation and behavioural finance. In the literature, the classical approach is to reduce the
problem to a concavified problem and to apply the classical techniques from the concave case.
While this approach is powerful for specific examples, it cannot be applied in the general
case.
The present paper analyzes the utility maximization problem directly. We first show the
existence and several properties of a maximizer of u(x, U ). As in the classical concave case,
this requires some additional assumptions that can be formulated in terms of the convex
conjugate J of the utility function U . In contrast to the literature, we also study the value
function u(x, U ) in detail. In particular, we show that u(x, Uc) is the concave envelope
of u(x, U ), which gives the relation between the maximization problem u(x, U ) and the
concavified problem u(x, Uc).
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In contrast to the concave case, the underlying probability space crucially affects the opti-
mization problem. While the value function u(x, U ) is not necessarily concave in general,
it is shown to be concave and to equal u(x, Uc) if the underlying probability space is atom-
less. This also gives a structural, easily verifiable assumption under which one can use the
concavified problem u(x, Uc) to analyze u(x, U ).
The significant impact of the underlying probability space raises a natural stability ques-
tion: Do small deviations from the atomless structure change the results in the atomless
model drastically? As an example, take a sequence of binomial models approximating the
Black–Scholes model and for every model, consider the utility maximization problem for a
fixed (not necessarily concave) utility U . It is then shown in Reichlin [33] that the sequences
of value functions and optimal final positions converge to the corresponding quantities in the
limit model. These results complement the present paper and provide additional intuition for
the optimal behaviour of agents with a not necessarily concave utility function.
Finally, we have to point out that our results depend crucially on the setup with one single
pricing measure. So our analysis can be seen as a first step which provides some fundamental
intuition about agents with not necessarily concave utility functions. It remains an interesting
and challenging problem to study the case with infinitely many pricing measures.
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Appendix
A. Facts from convex analysis
Let f : R → R¯ = R ∪ {±∞} be an extended real-valued function. The effective domain of
f , denoted by dom( f ), consists of all x ∈ R such that f (x) < ∞, and its interior is denoted
by int(dom( f )). The function f is called proper if both dom( f ) = ∅ and f (x) > −∞ for
all x . The conjugate of f is the extended real-valued function f ∗ on R defined by
f ∗(y) := sup
x∈R
(xy − f (x))
for all y ∈ R. The biconjugate f ∗∗ is defined by f ∗∗ := ( f ∗)∗. If f is proper, lower-
semicontinuous and convex, then its subdifferential ∂ f is the multivalued mapping defined
by ∂ f (x) = ∅ if f (x) = ∞ and
∂ f (x) := {y ∈ R | f (ξ) ≥ f (x) + y(ξ − x) for all ξ ∈ R} if x ∈ dom( f ).
The convex envelope f¯ of f is the largest convex function f¯ ≤ f .
Lemma A.1 Suppose that f is proper and lower-semicontinuous and its convex envelope
f¯ is proper as well. Then:
(i) f ∗ is convex, proper and lower-semicontinuous.
(ii) f and its convex envelope have the same conjugate.
(iii) f ∗∗ is the lower-semicontinuous envelope of the convex envelope f¯ .
(iv) Fix x0 ∈ dom( f ) and y0 ∈ ∂ f ∗∗(x0). If the conjugate f ∗ is differentiable in y0, then
f (x0) = f ∗∗(x0).
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Let f , in addition, be convex and extend the right and left derivative functions f ′+ and f ′−
beyond the interval dom( f ) by setting both = ∞ for points lying to the right of dom( f ) and
both = −∞ for points lying to the left. Then:
(v) y ∈ ∂ f (x) if and only if x ∈ ∂ f ∗(y).
(vi) y ∈ ∂ f (x) if and only if f (x) + f ∗(y) = xy.
(vii) Let x ∈ dom( f ). f has a unique subgradient at x if and only f is differentiable at x.
(viii) ∂ f (x) = {y ∈ R | f ′−(x) ≤ y ≤ f ′+(x)}.
(ix) f ′+(z1) ≤ f ′−(x) ≤ f ′+(x) ≤ f ′−(z2) when z1 < x < z2.
Proof Most properties can be found in Rockafellar [36]; see Theorem 23.5 for (v) and (vi)
Theorem 25.1 for (vii) and Theorem 24.1 and its discussion for (viii) and (ix). Statements (i),
(ii) and (iii) are part of Theorem 11.1 of Rockafellar and Wets [37]. Part (iv) can be found in
a similar form in Theorem 2 of Strömberg [39]. unionsq
We now apply Lemma A.1 with f (x) := −U (−x) to prove Lemmas 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10
and derive some additional properties. For convenience, we write dom( f ), dom( f ∗∗) and
∂ f ∗∗ in terms of the concave envelope Uc, i.e., dom(U ) := {x ∈ R | U (x) > −∞},
dom(Uc) := {x ∈ R | Uc(x) > −∞} and
∂Uc(x) := {p ∈ R | Uc(z) ≤ Uc(x) + p(z − x) for all z ∈ R}
for x ∈ dom(Uc). The functions −U (−x) and −Uc(−x) are both lower-semicontinuous on
R and proper. It therefore follows from part (iii) of Lemma A.1 that −Uc(−x) = f ∗∗(x).
Finally, note that J (y) = f ∗(y); so the convexity of J follows from part (i) of Lemma A.1.
Proof of Lemma 2.8 Basic properties of Uc: The condition (2.1) and the assumption
U (∞) > 0 imply that for any  > 0, there is x0 > 0 such that U (x) < x for all x ≥ x0 and
U (x0) > 0. Therefore, g(x) := U (x0) + x dominates U . Clearly, g is finite and concave.
Hence Uc ≤ g and we conclude that Uc is on (0,∞) finite and concave, hence continuous.
Moreover, the same argument also gives Uc(x)/x ≤  + U (x0)/x for x ≥ x0 which shows
that Uc satisfies condition (2.1) as well.
Uc is locally affine on {U < Uc}: If {U < Uc} is empty, there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise choose x0 ∈ {x ∈ R+ | U (x) < Uc(x)} and fix y0 ∈ ∂Uc(x0). Let us first consider
the case that y0 ∈ (0,∞). By way of contradiction, assume that J is differentiable in y0. By
Lemma A.1, (iv), it then follows that U (x0) = Uc(x0). But x0 is chosen in such a way that
U (x0) < Uc(x0). So J is not differentiable in y0 and it follows from Lemma A.1, (vii), that
∂ J (y0) is multivalued. Thus, we have y0 ∈ ∂Uc(x) for all x ∈ (−J ′+(y0),−J ′−(y0)), which
means that Uc is affine on that interval which also contains x0. The case y0 ∈ dom(J )\(0,∞)
corresponds to y0 = 0 ∈ ∂Uc(x0), which means that Uc is constant (hence affine) on
(−J ′+(0),∞) and −J ′+(0) ≤ x0.
Structure of {U < Uc}: The set {U < Uc} = {x ∈ R+ | U (x) − Uc(x) < 0} is open
since U −Uc is upper-semicontinuous. It can therefore be written as a union of disjoint open
intervals. By way of contradiction, assume that {U < Uc} contains (x0,∞) for some x0 ≥ 0.
Then Uc(x0) = U (x0) and Uc is affine on (x0,∞). This contradicts the growth condition
(2.1). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2.9 Monotonicity of J as well as J > −∞ on (0,∞) and J = ∞ on
(−∞, 0) follow from the definition. The fact that J < ∞ on (0,∞) follows from the growth
condition (2.1). The equivalence follows from Lemma A.1, (v) and (vi). Lemma A.1 (ii)
gives that U and Uc have the same convex conjugate. unionsq
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Lemma A.2 U (−J ′±(y)) = Uc(−J ′±(y)) for y > 0. If −J ′+(0) < ∞, then also
U (−J ′+(0)) = Uc(−J ′+(0)).
Proof Recall that J is decreasing on (0,∞) = int(dom(J )). So −J ′±(y) is positive and
finite. By way of contradiction, assume that there is y > 0 with U (−J ′±(y)) < Uc(−J ′±(y)).
By Lemma 2.8, {U < Uc} = ⋃i (ai , bi ) is open. Hence there are i , z1, z2 such that
ai < z1 < −J ′±(y) < z2 < bi . By Lemma 2.8, Uc is affine on (ai , bi ) and by Lemma
2.9, we know that U ′c(−J ′±(y)) = y. This means that zi ∈−∂J (y) which contradicts Lemma
A.1, (viii). If −J ′+(0)<∞, the same idea gives U (−J ′+(0)) = Uc(−J ′+(0)). unionsq
Lemma A.3 The convex conjugate J satisfies limy→∞ supx∈−∂ J (y) x = 0.
Proof Since x ≤ −J ′−(y) for all x ∈ −∂ J (y), it is sufficient to show that
lim
y→∞ −J
′−(y) = 0. (A.1)
If y˜ := limx→0 supy∈∂Uc(x) y < ∞, we have that ∂ J (y) = 0 for y > y˜. If
limx→0 supy∈∂Uc(x) y = ∞, fix  > 0 and y0 := supy∈∂Uc() y. For q ∈ ∂Uc() and
y > y0, we have q ≤ y0 < y. Lemma 2.9 gives − ∈ ∂ J (q) and Lemma A.1, (ix) implies
−J ′−(y) ≤ −J ′−(y0) ≤ , which finishes the proof of (A.1). unionsq
It remains to prove Lemma 2.10. The equivalence is proved in Lemma 4.1 of Deelstra et
al. [19]. We only prove the second part.
Proof of Lemma 2.10 We argue that there are x0 > 0 and γ < 1 such that
0 ≤ Uc(x) ≤ U (x) + γUc(x) on (x0,∞). (A.2)
The result then follows for k = 1/(1 − γ ).
Proposition 4.1. of Deelstra et al. [19] shows that AE0(J ) < ∞ and the growth condition
(2.1) imply the existence of two constants x0 and γ < 1 such that supy∈∂Uc(x) yx ≤ γUc(x)
holds on (x0,∞). By moving x0 to the right if necessary, we may assume that U (x0) is
positive. Moreover, recall that Uc is locally affine on {U < Uc} = ⋃i (ai , bi ). So, for
x ∈ (ai , bi ) ∩ (x0,∞), we rewrite Uc(x), use that Uc(ai ) = U (ai ) ≤ U (x) and apply for
y = U ′c(x) the above inequality U ′c(x)x ≤ γUc(x) to get
Uc(x) = Uc(ai ) + U ′c(x)(x − ai ) ≤ U (x) + U ′c(x)x ≤ U (x) + γUc(x).
For x ∈ {U = Uc} ∩ (x0,∞), (A.2) follows since U (x) = Uc(x) is positive. unionsq
B. Non-smooth utility maximization
This appendix contains the results on non-smooth (concave) utility maximization which are
relevant for the proofs in Sect. 5. It combines non-smooth versions of results of Jin et al. [28]
and known results on non-smooth utility maximization as presented in Bouchard et al. [14]
and Westray and Zheng [41]. We use the same notation as in Sects. 3 and 4.
Theorem 3.3 shows that Assumption 3.1 is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a
maximizer for u(x, Uc) for all x > 0. Under the weaker assumption that u(x, Uc) < ∞ for
some x > 0, the existence of a maximizer is still obtained for some x > 0.
Proposition B.1 Assume that u(x, Uc) < ∞ for some x > 0. Then there exists x˜ > 0 such
that for x ∈ (0, x˜), the problem u(x, Uc) admits a maximizer. Every maximizer f ∗ is of the
form f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λ∗ϕ) for some λ∗ > 0.
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This result as well as its proof are non-smooth versions of Corollary 3.1 and its proof in
Jin et al. [28]. The proof is based on the following lemma which is the non-smooth version
of Theorem 3.1 of Jin et al. [28].
Lemma B.2 If E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ] = ∞ for some λ > 0, there is some x > 0 such that
u(x, Uc) = ∞.
Proof (1) We start with the case Uc(0) := limx→0 Uc(x) ≥ 0. Fix some λ0 > 0 and x > 0.
Since E[−J ′+(λ0ϕ)ϕ] = ∞, one can find a set A ∈ F such that E[−J ′+(λ0ϕ)ϕ1A] ∈ (x,∞).
Define h(λ) := E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ1A] for λ ∈ [λ0,∞). Since −J ′− is decreasing, the function
h(λ) is decreasing. Moreover, the monotone convergence theorem and Lemma A.3 yield
limλ→∞ h(λ) = 0. Therefore, there is some λ1 ≥ λ0 such that
E[−J ′+(λ1ϕ)ϕ1A] = h(λ1+) ≤ x ≤ h(λ1−) = E[−J ′−(λ1ϕ)ϕ1A].
Thus we find f ∗ satisfying E[ϕ f ∗] = x and f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λ1ϕ) on A. Lemma 2.9 gives
Uc( f ∗(ω)) = J (λ1ϕ(ω)) + f ∗(ω)λ1ϕ(ω) for ω ∈ A and Uc( f ∗(ω)) = Uc(0) for ω ∈ Ac.
The assumption Uc ≥ 0 implies J ≥ 0 and we conclude that
E[Uc( f ∗)] ≥ E[(J (λ1ϕ) + f ∗λ1ϕ)1A] ≥ λ1 E[ϕ f ∗1A] = λ1x ≥ λ0x .
Since λ0 > 0 is arbitrary, we arrive at u(x, Uc) ≥ limλ→∞ λx = ∞.
(2) For the general case, define a shifted utility U x0c (x) := Uc(x0 + x) on R+, where
x0 := inf{x > 0 | U (x) ≥ 0}, and denote the convex conjugate of U x0c by J x0 . If we show
(as we do below) that
E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ] = ∞ ∀ λ > 0 ⇒ E[−(J x0)′+(λϕ)ϕ] = ∞ ∀ λ > 0, (B.1)
we can use the fact that U x0c ≥ 0 and part 1) to see that
u(x˜, Uc) ≥ sup{E[Uc( f ) | f ∈ L0+, f ≥ x0, E[ϕ f ] ≤ x˜} = ∞
for x˜ large enough, which gives the statement of the lemma.
It remains to prove (B.1). In order to relate ∂ J x0 and ∂ J , note that
J x0(y) − x0 y = sup
x>0
{Uc(x0 + x) − (x + x0)y} ≤ J (y) (B.2)
holds for arbitrary y > 0. For y ≤ y0 := infq∈∂Uc(x0) q , fix some x˜ ∈ −∂ J (y) and note that
x˜ ≥ x0 by Lemma A.1, (ix). Together with the conjugacy relation between x˜ and y and the
definition of J x0 , we obtain
J (y) = Uc(x˜) − x˜ y = Uc
(
x0 + (x˜ − x0)
) − (x˜ − x0)y − x0 y ≤ J x0(y) − x0 y,
which implies that there is equality in (B.2) for y ≤ y0. We use this together with the definition
of (J x0)′− and (B.2) (in this order) to see that for y < y0,
J (y) + ((J x0)′−(y) − x0
)
(z − y)
= J x0(y) − x0 y + (J x0)′−(y)(z − y) − x0(z − y) ≤ J x0(z) − x0z ≤ J (z)
holds for z > 0 which means that (J x0)′−(y) − x0 ∈ ∂ J (y) for y < y0. Since
E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ1{λϕ>y0}] ≤ −J ′+(y0) < ∞, the assumption E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ] = ∞ for all
λ > 0 also implies
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E
[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ1{λϕ≤y0}
] = E [−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ
(
1 − 1{λϕ>y0}
)]
≥ E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ] − J ′+(y0) = ∞ (B.3)
for all λ > 0. But then, plugging (J x0)′−(y) − x0 ∈ ∂ J (y) into (B.3) gives
∞ = E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ1{λϕ≤y0}] ≤ E
[− ((J x0)′−(λϕ) − x0
)
ϕ1{λϕ≤y0}
]
≤ E [−(J x0)′−(λϕ)ϕ
] + x0
for every λ > 0, which finishes the proof of (B.1). unionsq
Proof of Proposition B.1 The assumption u(x, Uc) < ∞ for some x > 0 and the concavity
of u(·, Uc) imply that u(x, Uc) < ∞ for all x > 0. Thus we apply Lemma B.2 to get
λ0 > 0 satisfying x˜ := E[−J ′+(λ0ϕ)ϕ] < ∞. Similarly to the proof of Lemma B.2,
define h(λ) := E[−J ′+(λϕ)ϕ] for λ ∈ [λ0,∞). Since −J ′+ is decreasing, the function
h(λ) is decreasing. Moreover, the monotone convergence theorem and Lemma A.3 yield
limλ→∞ h(λ) = 0. Hence for all x ∈ (0, x˜], there is some λ1 ≥ λ0 such that
E[−J ′+(λ1ϕ)ϕ] = h(λ1+) ≤ x ≤ h(λ1−) = E[−J ′−(λ1ϕ)ϕ].
Thus we find f ∗ satisfying E[ϕ f ∗] = x and f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λ1ϕ). In order to show optimality of
f ∗, consider f ∈ C(x) and note that E[ϕ f ] ≤ x by the definition of C(x). It follows from
the definition of J , Lemma 2.9 and E[ϕ f ∗] = x that
E[Uc( f )] = E[Uc( f ) − λ1 f ϕ] + E[λ1 f ϕ]
≤ E[J (λ1ϕ)] + λ1x
= E[Uc( f ∗)] − E[ f ∗ϕλ1] + λ1x = E[Uc( f ∗)]. (B.4)
Hence u(x, Uc) = E[Uc( f ∗)] since f ∈ C(x) was arbitrary. Note that the inequality
in (B.4) is strict if f /∈ −∂ J (λ1ϕ) on a set with strictly positive measure. Thus any other
maximizer fˆ satisfies fˆ ∈ −∂ J (λ1ϕ) as well. unionsq
Under Assumption 3.1, Theorem 3.2 in Bouchard et al. [14] or Theorem 5.1 in Westray
and Zheng [41] give that Proposition B.1 holds for any x > 0:
Proposition B.3 Suppose Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Then the concave problem u(x, Uc)
has a solution f ∗ ∈ C(x) for every x > 0. Every solution satisfies f ∗ ∈ −∂ J (λ∗ϕ) for some
λ∗ ≥ 0.
C. Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof The fact that Assumption 3.1 implies u(x, U ) < ∞ for x > 0 is straightforward
since we have E[U ( f )] ≤ E[Uc( f )] ≤ E[J (λϕ)] + λx0 for all f ∈ C(x0) and λ > 0.
For the converse direction, we use that AE0(J ) < ∞ and u(x, Uc) < ∞ for some x > 0
imply Assumption 3.1 (see for instance Lemma 5.4 of Westray and Zheng [41]). It is therefore
sufficient to show that AE0(J ) < ∞ and u(x, U ) < ∞ for some x > 0 imply u(x, Uc) < ∞
for some x > 0. For this, let x0 > 0 and k be as given in the second part of Lemma 2.10 so
that
0 ≤ Uc(x) ≤ kU (x) on (x0,∞). (C.1)
If U is positive on (0,∞), then fix some f ∈ C(x) and apply (C.1) on the set { f > x0}. This
gives E[Uc( f )] ≤ Uc(x0)+ k E[U ( f )] and taking the supremum over all f ∈ C(x) implies
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u(x, Uc) ≤ Uc(x0) + ku(x, U ). So if u(x, U ) is finite for some x > 0, then u(x, Uc) is also
finite.
If U (0) < 0, we choose  small enough such that x −  > 0, fix f ∈ C(x − ) and apply
the above argument to f := f +  and U (x) − U (). This gives
E[Uc( f )] ≤ E[Uc( f)]
≤ Uc(x0) + k E[(U ( f) − U ())1{ f≥x0}] + k E[U ()1{ f≥x0}]
≤ Uc(x0) + k E[U ( f) − U ()] + k E[U ()1{ f≥x0}]
≤ Uc(x0) + ku(x, U ) + k|U ()|,
where f ∈ C(x) is used in the last step. Taking the supremum over all f ∈ C(x − ) gives
then u(x − , Uc) ≤ ku(x, U ) + k˜ for some constant k˜ and the result follows. unionsq
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